TAKING STOCK: THE MADNESS
OF MARKETS
Jerry Harkins
“The current crisis has demonstrated that neither bank regulators, nor
anyone else, can consistently and accurately forecast whether, for example,
subprime mortgages will turn toxic.”
—Alan Greenspan,
March 10, 2010
Poppycock! Total, utter
nonsense! The truth is that it is
in the nature of bubbles to burst.
The truth is that you can’t make silk purses out of pigs’ ears. The truth is that anyone who tries to
slice and dice subprime mortgages—or subprime anything else—and thereby turn
them into investment grade securities needs his or her head examined. The run-up to the crash of 2008 was an
obvious bubble and the subsequent meltdown was entirely predictable. Its ramifications were near catastrophic
and are still being felt around the world.
The markets for stocks, bonds, commodities and other asset classes play
several crucial rolls in all capitalist societies. Economically, they provide the capital companies and
governments need to promote innovation and efficiency. Socially, they provide the basis for
virtually all savings especially those meant to support major family
expenditures such as housing, education and retirement. They act as the principal means of
encouraging sustainability in terms of resource utilization and other social
goals. By their very nature, they
act as insurance that the long term interests of both the economy and the
society are taken into consideration in the decision-making process. Or they should do all these
things. But the crash of 2008 was
compelling evidence that these functions were being jettisoned in favor of the
extremely dangerous idea that markets are nothing more than ultra short term,
high stakes casinos.
There had been early warning signs. Amidst the euphoria characteristic of the markets around the
turn of the century, there were some naysayers, among them the executives of
Procter and Gamble who saw portents of stormy weather. In early 2000, P and G had been looking
forward to profit growth of 13% above 1999. That would have been spectacular performance but on the
morning of Tuesday, March 7, 2000 the company released a statement saying that
earnings for fiscal year 2000 would likely be only 7% higher than 1999. By any rational standard this would
still be outstanding performance.
But, the minute the stock market opened, P and G took a 30-point or 33%
hit. Within three minutes, $36
billion of its market valuation simply evaporated. Poof! By week’s
end, the stock shed an additional $4 billion. It wasn’t a complete surprise. The market had already taken the company down by 25% from its 1999 high. Even at 13%, it was no longer a sexy “new economy” company.
Proctor and Gamble was and is among the bluest of the blue chips. Founded in 1837, it has always been one
of the best managed entities in the world, right up there with IBM and GE. It is as recession proof as any company
can be, home to a roster of global consumer brands including Ivory Soap (1880),
Crisco (1911), Tide detergent (1946), Crest toothpaste (1955), Pampers diapers
(1961), Folgers coffee (acquired 1963), Bounty paper towels (1965), Clairol
hair coloring (acquired 2001) and dozens of others. By contemporary standards, it is big but not huge. In 2013, its sales amounted to $84
billion and its net earnings were about $11 billion. Its market valuation was $220 billion, only $10 billion less
than Facebook. In 2014, it ranked
31 on the Fortune list of the 500 largest U.S. corporations.
In a rational world (or in an efficient market), it simply could not
have lost 33% of its value in a matter of minutes. But what happened to it was not uncommon in 2000 as one
company after another performed well but not well enough to satisfy the
voracious expectations of growth that Wall Street had come to believe were its
birthright. Stock prices were now
being governed by these expectations rather than by conventional measures of
value. James J. Cramer, a pundit
for TheStreet.com, taunted traditional value investors by writing, “All of that
price-to-earnings flotsam and discount-to-normalized-earnings jetsam didn’t
save you today.” Still, the idea
that investors would bail out of P and G because it might grow by only 7% was a
sign that something was very wrong in the stock market, something that has
gotten progressively worse in the succeeding fifteen years and that threatens both
the economic and the social functions of markets.
There had been other warnings.
On October 19, 1987, “Black Monday,” the Dow Jones Industrial Average [1]
lost 22.6% of its value on volume that was twice the previous record. It was the worst day in the history of
the market and no one knew why. It
subsequently inspired a vast speculative literature but to this day no one really
knows why it happened. Then and now,
much of the discussion centered around “program trading” which was initiated by
computerized systems responding to various “trigger” events. But there had been no obvious
triggers. There were concerns
about rising interest rates and an unexpected increase in the trade deficit but
there is nothing unusual about such concerns or about Wall Street being
surprised by them. Wall Street is
easily surprised. It was also in
some ways a slow motion crash. On the
previous Wednesday, the Dow Jones had lost a then-record 95 points and two days
later it shed another 108 points. On
Monday, intense selling pressure overwhelmed the trading systems which were
reporting over an hour late thereby adding to the anxiety. But it was not Armageddon. The market began to recover on Tuesday
suggesting that traders knew it had been oversold. Two months later, it ended the year up slightly over 1986
and began an historic rise that lasted twenty years with only minor
interruptions. On a long term
chart, the 1987 crash appears as a mere blip. Still it was not your grandfather’s classic panic and the
psychology of the market has never been the same.
Extreme crashes are blessedly infrequent but since 1987 global markets
have witnessed a spectacular increase in average volatility. [3] For example, in the first
quarter of 2015, the DJIA posted an increase of 0.008%, a virtually flat
performance. But on March 30, it
had a gain of 263 points, more than 1%.
The following day, the last session of the quarter, yielded a loss of
200 points. This was not
unusual. Since 1987, the indices have
often gone down 1% or more one day and up 1% or more the next day and such
volatility can continue for weeks on end.
Why? It has absolutely
nothing to do with the underlying value of the economy or even for its
prospects. Most recently, oil
futures prices and interest rate fears have taken much of the blame. When oil is down, though, the market
may rise or fall. When the Federal
Reserve is thought to be signaling the end of low interest rates, it is taken
as cataclysmic news. We seem to be
living through a period when tea leaves set off earthquakes. The market has become a gambling den
for professional players who constantly strive to game the system by shedding
risk and passing it off to others.
They are true believers in the adage that there’s a sucker born every
minute.
Again this is nothing new.
As St. Paul points out, “…the love of money is a root
of all kinds of evil.” He might
have added that the love of money can readily transform itself into the love
of more money which we call greed.
And greed
seems to be an inherent concomitant of free markets and a constant challenge to
regulators. It is essential that
all market participants have incentives but it is human nature that incentives
tend to become addictive and require more and more to satisfy the hunger. Like all addictions, the process is insidious
corrupting some players in ways they may not even notice. Some very smart
people wind up doing stupid things in the belief that they won’t be
caught.
Shortly before he went to jail for insider trading, Ivan Boesky
famously told students at the University of California, “I think greed is
healthy. You can be greedy and still feel good about yourself.” This line became famous when
paraphrased by Gordon Gekko in “Wall Street” (1987) and by Larry the Liquidator
in “Other People’s Money” (1991).
But it is not true. Once
natural self-interest metastasizes into avarice it becomes both sociopathic and
self-destructive. The trick is to
recognize and excise the cancer before it reaches that point. This is easier said than done as is
evident from the headline scandals of the last generation. Among them were Archer Daniels Midland (price fixing, 1995), Enron (accounting fraud, 2001), Tyco (racketeering, 2002), WorldCom (accounting fraud, 2002), Health South (Bribery, 2003) and, of course, Madoff Securities (Ponzi scheme, 2008).
What
is captivating about this list is the diversity of the alleged crimes from
simple theft to the most exotic financial skullduggery. The Tyco executives were accused of
stealing $600 million from the company by giving themselves unauthorized loans
and issuing stock fraudulently. It
was little more than a mugging with the money going to high living including a
$2 million birthday party for the Chariman's wife and a $6,000 shower curtain for his
bathroom. It actually hurt almost
no one including the shareholders who have seen their stock rise nicely. The Enron case was quite the
opposite: a grab bag of elaborate
almost incomprehensible financial schemes meant to present to the world the
picture of a huge, successful energy company. The outside world knew it as Number 6 on Fortune Magazine’s
list of the largest 500 global corporations. In fact, it was nothing of the sort. It had already been sucked dry by gross
mismanagement and Wonderland accounting designed to conceal the losses and
bleed California electric ratepayers.
The key players were paying themselves enormous salaries and bonuses but,
like Tyco, those had little long term effect on the company. Mostly it seemed these geniuses were
covering up for their own operating mistakes. In any event, the important point is that very few people
could ever claim to understand their financial machinations. In this regard, Bernie Madoff was a
throwback to a simpler era. So
simple that he was able to fool regulators and clients for twenty years or more
depending on whom you believe.
Ultimately the law caught up with him. His penalty did nothing to deter the next dozen or so Ponzi
schemes.
As
bad as these scandals were, they did little to affect the market as a
whole. Enron, for example, hurt a
lot of people, mostly shareholders to the tune of $74 billion (including
employees’ pension savings) and creditors totaling about $67 billion. However, substantial recoveries were
realized and the total actual loss (not counting overpayments by Californians
for their utilities) was probably just under $11 billion. The scandal also contributed to the
market downturn of 2000-2003 but its impact was dwarfed by the events of
9/11. The Madoff scandal may have
exacerbated the 2008 meltdown but, again, its was overshadowed by the subprime
mortgage fiasco which represents a whole new level of financial deviltry.
Traditionally,
residential mortgages were safe investments. For one thing, people who were not creditworthy generally could
not get them. For another,
mortgagees tend to prioritize their mortgage payments each month. Beginning in the 1980’s, however, banks
began to market adjustable rate loans to borrowers with less than excellent
credit. This virtually guaranteed
that the default rate would increase.
About the same time, Michael Milken was discovering that high yield or
“junk” bonds issued by financially stressed corporations could be packaged
together. Each such package would
have a known risk of default which would be fully reflected by their high
yields. In essence, this meant
that they could be marketed as though they were high quality investment grade
securities. Milken’s theory might
work in an environment of stable
markets but it was soon being applied to packages of subprime mortgages and
other instruments that were unstable by definition.
“Securitization”
itself can be a useful financial tool and it is important to separate the
theory from the insider trading and other abuses that came to be associated
with its practice. Unfortunately,
the “rocket scientists” of Wall Street could not leave well enough alone. They began to create more and more
exotic investments by separating out every conceivable aspect of the underlying
loans and focusing exclusively on their short term performance prospects. Given a basic package consisting of,
say, 100,000 subprime mortgages, an investor, usually a bank or an insurance
company, could buy an instrument that exposed it to only the principal
repayment stream or only the interest stream or to some combination of both
based on the average yield and/or the average maturity. The possibilities got even more
abstract when investors were able to buy and sell puts and calls on options or
future contracts or engage in custom tailored “swaps” of any combination
thereof. In the
monkey-see-monkey-do world of high finance, it soon became possible to make
exotic bets on interest rates, weather conditions and space on oil tankers. And this was only the beginning of a
process that has rendered investments increasingly abstract and increasingly
divorced from the real world and its long term interests. In many cases, Wall Street sold
instruments that had no palpable connection to any underlying value. In the most notorious cases the bankers
who engineered these instruments did so specifically in order to bet against
them and thus against the customers who bought them. It was roulette.
For the customers, Russian roulette.
We
have already noted that the increasing volatility of the stock market is not caused
by anything in the real world. A
good example of Wonderland markets is the price of oil. By now we are accustomed to sudden
spikes in the price of gas at the pump and we have learned to pay attention to
the price of crude oil. Supply and
demand play a small role in this phenomenon but the real culprit is the little
understood futures market. A
futures contract is an agreement to buy or sell some commodity—in this case 1000
barrels of crude oil—at a given price on a given date in the future, often 90
days from the date the contract was originally made. These contracts can be traded at any time during their life
and are usually traded many times before they expire. A few players actually want to buy or sell the oil but the
vast majority have no interest in or ability to cope with the real stuff. They are gamblers, pure and simple, who
will eventually settle their positions in cash. They will be the first to claim they provide important
liquidity to the market which is true except that the market needs only a tiny
fraction of that liquidity.
Meanwhile, their speculation overwhelms the market for real oil and sets
the price for vital commodities like gasoline at the pump and home heating
oil. It is as though the value of
the dollar were determined by the Las Vegas blackjack tables. The same insanity applies to the
markets for wheat, soybeans, bacon and, if you remember the movie “Trading
Places,” frozen orange juice concentrate.
Future
contracts were invented 5,000 years ago in Mesopotamia and have been essential
enablers ever since in agriculture and large scale extractive industries. They provide a level of financial stability
to actual producers and users of a wide range of commodities. Future contracts on interest rates and
other financial benchmarks are important risk management tools for banks. But as a form of gambling, they become
more complex over time. Complexity
increases the probability of what mathematicians call “cascading failures” of
their component parts which lead to catastrophic failures. As this is written, the major disaster
scenarios are related to “algorithmic trading” most notably to the form known
as high frequency trading (HFT), a strategy that redefines the notion of short
term from minutes to microseconds.
In
today’s market, 2% of the traders employ HFT and related strategies which allow
them to buy and sell huge positions instantaneously. The most popular of these strategies account for between 50%
and 75% of daily trading all of which is transacted by computers programmed
with highly sophisticated algorithms, statistical models that track a wide
variety of trigger events. The SEC
has said that such a system caused the “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010. It began with the sale of 75,000
“E-Mini” futures contracts worth $4.1 billion at 3:32 PM. (E-Minis are bets on the Standard and Poor 500
Index. Each contract has a nominal
value of 50 times the value of the Index at any given moment.) The May 6 sale triggered other black
box systems with the result that E-Minis came to define the real value of the
real securities in the Index.
Within 3 minutes, the it dropped 3%. Between 2:41 PM and 3:00 PM, the Dow dropped 998 points or
9.2% of its value and then turned around and regained most of the loss closing
the day down 384 points or 3.2%. For
a half hour, the market experienced a total disconnect from anything resembling
the real world. [4]
If
all this were merely a case of the inmates running the asylum it would be a
tightly circumscribed problem of little concern to most people. But the stock market is too important
to ignore even at a time when fewer than half of Americans are exposed to
it. The various commodity markets
are crucial to those directly involved in producing and using the
commodities. Real estate is
central to almost everyone. In short, the
financial system is the foundation of the economic, social and cultural
architecture of the entire community and it is in desperate need of reform
which will not be easy. Even if
the solutions were obvious there is at present no political appetite for
reform. Throughout the developed
world there is an epidemic of self interest and economic disarray that bodes
ill for the kind of concerted and determined action that was achieved at Breton
Woods in 1944.
We
tend to forget that money is an artificial construct and that it and the
systems involved in storing and circulating it are highly abstract, fragile
and reactive. Neither dollars nor
diamonds have any intrinsic value but are “worth” only what someone is willing
to pay for them. [5] The systems used to regulate markets tend, on the other
hand, to be clumsy compromises based on political ideology and are therefore slow
to recognize changing conditions. Moreover,
any changes that are made in the governance of the financial markets must be
coordinated with equally profound changes that need to be made in the broader
economy. We face a daunting
challenge. But as timeframes
collapse and the global economy becomes ever more interconnected market
contradictions become less tenable and more threatening. Time is short and the river is rising.
Subsequent Events
In the first quarter of 2020, volatility went through the roof of every stock market in the world, supposedly because of the pandemic caused by the coronavirus. Actually, the down days seemed like nothing but a typical panic in the face of uncertainty. It was as though the computers thought markets were normally certain and therefore risk-free. The up days, on the other hand, looked like computers grasping at straws. It was not edifying.
Earlier, Navinder Sarao who had singlehandedly caused the Flash Crash (see Note 4 below) was convicted in a Chicago courtroom and sentenced to a year of home confinement at his parents' house in London. He apologized for his prank, attributing it to Asperger's Syndrome, and claimed to have "found God." The leniency was supported by the prosecution which thanked him for educating them about exotic stock market fraud.
Notes
In the first quarter of 2020, volatility went through the roof of every stock market in the world, supposedly because of the pandemic caused by the coronavirus. Actually, the down days seemed like nothing but a typical panic in the face of uncertainty. It was as though the computers thought markets were normally certain and therefore risk-free. The up days, on the other hand, looked like computers grasping at straws. It was not edifying.
Earlier, Navinder Sarao who had singlehandedly caused the Flash Crash (see Note 4 below) was convicted in a Chicago courtroom and sentenced to a year of home confinement at his parents' house in London. He apologized for his prank, attributing it to Asperger's Syndrome, and claimed to have "found God." The leniency was supported by the prosecution which thanked him for educating them about exotic stock market fraud.
Notes
1. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) of 30 large U.S. companies is
a reasonable and widely understood simulacrum for the U.S. equities
market. There are several more
accurate measures notably the Standard and Poor’s 500 or the Russell 3000 but
all are fairly well correlated and the Dow Jones has the advantage of a much
longer history. The Dow of course
is no longer restricted to industrial companies but includes such as American
Express, Disney, Goldman Sachs and Wal-Mart.
2. Not everyone. In 2013, Pew Research Center reported
that investors were primarily white, middle aged college graduates with annual incomes
over $75,000. Currently, slightly
less than half of Americans are exposed to the stock market either directly or
indirectly, the lowest participation rate in many years. The recent high was 65% in 2007, the
year before the real estate bubble burst and the economy crashed. Most Americans are not good savers (in
part because wages have not kept up with inflation). The average net worth of American adults is about $301,000
but the median is only $45,000, another reflection of economic disparity. Most of that net worth is in real
estate.
3. The academic literature
is full of analyses of every conceivable kind of volatility almost all of which
is useless in the real market. I
use the term here to discuss the fluctuation of price over a given period of
time. Obviously the greater the
change and the shorter the period the higher the volatility.
4. On April 21, 2015,
British authorities arrested one Navinder Sarao on a 22-count complaint of
market manipulation issued by the U.S. Department of Justice. Mr. Sarao is a London day trader
accused of causing the Flash Crash by “spoofing,” a technique of entering
thousands of large but fake buy and/or sell orders simultaneously in an attempt
to influence HFT algorithims.
Conservative publications rushed to his defense and legal pundits
emphasized that the government would have a hard time proving its case. The charges against him carried a prison term of 380 years which may have been what encouraged him to cop a plea to one count. He was sentenced in late 2017. Anyone seriously interested in the mechanics of high frequency trading and their sociopathic implications should read Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt by Michael Lewis (Norton, 2014).
5. Intrinsic value is
another one of those slippery terms you struggled with in Economics 101 and
this is not the place to attempt to resolve it. Once upon a time, gold was defined as being worth $32 an
ounce. Why? Because some economists and diplomats
said so. It was arbitrary but useful
in a simpler age. The price (and
therefore the value) of gold is now set by the gold market which, like the stock
market, is made up mostly of gamblers.
A painting by Pablo Picasso recently sold at auction for close to $180
million. Please note that no
combination of canvas and paint has an intrinsic value of $180 million.